ABSTRACT
This Article revisits the long-standing academic debate on the corporate objective, typically enshrined in the question of in whose interest should large public corporations be run. This has been traditionally addressed by two main theoretical paradigms: shareholder value and stakeholder theory. The global financial crisis of 2008 (GFC) and the events thereafter have reignited the urgency to firstly, further define this theoretical debate, or expand it beyond the above dichotomy, and secondly, find an appropriate legal framework to address the fundamental question of corporate decision-making. Notwithstanding the necessity to recalibrate problems related to corporate decision-making, neither of the above questions has resulted in substantial changes in the way the problem of the corporate objective is theorized and treated in business and legal circles. [Vol. 12 of balancing diverging interests in the decision-making process of large public corporations.
In Part I, this Article defines the importance and the difficulty of directing decision-making processes in large public corporations. This is followed, in Part II, by a critique of the two existing models of corporate management (shareholder value and stakeholder theory), which highlights each theory's assumptions and the impact that each has on the running of large public firms. While much has been written on the topic, the unfolding of events within the GFC shows that the need to find an alternative approach to the issue of the corporate objective remains, mainly because of its centrality in defining legal strategies to control and direct managerial behavior, but also because of the shortcomings of the above models.
The asserted urgency to find a new theoretical model to govern managerial actions and align such actions with the interests of a broader range of constituencies leads to the proposition of a new framework. In Part III, the enlightened sovereign control (ESC) paradigm is put forward as an alternative model to shareholder value and stakeholder theory. In proposing a pluralistic theoretical foundation, the ESC provides the background for more specific measures to regulate managerial behavior and channel decision-making in boards of directors.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE IMPORTANCE OF DECISION-MAKING IN LARGE PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
The ongoing economic crisis, sparked in 2008, has re-evoked memories of the Great Depression and, more surprisingly, of the regulatory and policy concerns that emerged at that time. The quotes at the beginning of this Article reflect striking similarities with some of the current issues faced within both academic and political circles. While President Roosevelt pointed in more general terms to the concentration of private power as a threat to the functions of a democratic state, Adolf Berle had framed the problem by identifying public corporations as the vehicle that elicits the concentration of private power, which could supersede the democratic state and escape regulation. 10 This section provides a background to this Article's main theme as it explains why it is important to establish sound mechanisms of decisionmaking in large public corporations.
Large public corporations 11 have reached a new zenith. In the age of globalization, their position within society has become increasingly central 10 . See Roosevelt's Message to Congress, supra note 1. 11. Large public firms are referred to in this Article as listed corporate entities that, because of their size and activities, create externalities on a varied range of constituencies. Examples of this category are represented by financial institutions, multinational corporations, or companies involved in the extraction of natural resources. This categorization will be discussed in more detail in the second part of this Article. 
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The Corporate Law Dilemma 245 because they stand as catalysts of financial, economic, and social changes. While this was already recognized by Berle, the magnitude of corporate power has today reached a new dimension. One reason for this is the muchaugmented interplay between corporations and capital markets that has taken place since the 1980s in the United Kingdom and the United States. The liberalization and then the progressive deregulation of financial centers (chiefly London and New York, but this process extended globally) created new opportunities for multinational corporations to diversify sources of capital and enhance their returns through innovative corporate finance strategies. 12 The increased interdependence with capital market logics accentuated the alignment of corporate decision-making with the pursuit of increases in share value (i.e., shareholder wealth maximization), which has also become the main metric to gauge corporate success. The interest of shareholders became preponderant in the context of financialized economies and brought about a redefinition of corporate success, which is today distanced from the concept of wealth creation. 13 Even though the goal of maximizing shareholder value is not prescribed by the law-both in the United Kingdom and in the United States
14
-it has come to represent the chief priority of corporate management, often to the detriment of other constituencies that are also vital components of corporations. 15 The process just described, referred to by Professor Lawrence Mitchell as "financialization" of corporate law, has extended beyond the United Kingdom and the United States. 16 Although there are reasons to believe that there is no "end of history" in sight for corporate law, 17 20 Some of these legal issues have surfaced repeatedly through a number of crises and scandals that occurred over the last decade, and the GFC has proposed them with new vigor. Generally speaking, corporate governance problems can be encapsulated in the failure to establish sound mechanisms of control over managerial behavior. This pertains to both internal governance mechanisms, represented most prominently by the function of non-executive directors (NED) on the board, and to external mechanisms, which rely on market forces (chiefly the employment of stock options, or the market for corporate control) and on the role of gatekeepers. At a higher level, a more deep-seated corporate governance problem is represented by the unresolved dilemma of the corporate objective, which has become more urgent because of the widespread employment of shareholder value as a parameter of corporate success.
21
It is worth stressing that identifying the corporate objective with the interest of one constituency-shareholders-proves more problematic in the context of large corporations, because these entities are the offspring of the cooperation between different stakeholders, 22 and more importantly because their actions can create externalities on a very broad range of corporate and societal constituencies. In this context, the corporate governance problems above are exemplified by the failure of boards of directors (BoDs) to weigh different interests at stake and to understand the long-term risks related to certain activities. Relevant illustrations in this sense are provided by the BP oil spill in 2010 and by the behavior of most banks involved in the GFC. 23 Arguably, the BoDs' failures were all underscored by the intellectual bias flowing from shareholder value rhetoric and from the short-term goals embedded in it, which contributed to highlight the problem of 
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"managerialism" originally noted by Berle. 24 A brief illustration of the above contextualizes the discussion of the role of shareholder value as a mechanism of corporate decision-making.
In the case of BP, the oil spill unveiled the inadequate supervision of high-risk activities related to oil extraction. The nature of BP's business and the repercussions of its activities on local communities in the Gulf of Mexico prompted reflections on how the company was balancing different interests 25 and the extent of its approach to corporate social responsibility (CSR). 26 It has been observed that BP repeatedly bypassed environmental legislation in order to achieve short-term profits flowing from its oil extraction activities.
27
BP's business, in other words, was primarily focused on profitability, 28 and the company acted in a socially responsible way only insofar as this could contribute to its "green image," or when it would not hinder profitability.
29
Decision-making at the board level showed that environmental concerns, and more generally CSR, were considered subordinated interests to the creation of short-term profits for shareholders. As it became evident, this went to the detriment of many stakeholders whose interest was not represented on BP's board.
The facts of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and its nationalization prove the same points. In the pre-crisis years, RBS had become particularly engaged in subprime lending, exposing the bank to high risks related to complex structured finance products. 30 While the company profited enormously from participating in this market, it failed to oversee the risks that were accruing due to increased levels of leverage and the insufficient capital that RBS was operating with. Ensuing problems of liquidity meant that the bank was highly vulnerable to market shocks. 31 As it is well known, RBS' perilous position was further aggravated by the decision to acquire ABN Amro in 2007. This was driven, inter alia, by desires to further increase the bank's asset growth. It also, however, resulted in increasing RBS's exposures to asset classes that were the subject of market concerns. 32 The failure of the Scottish bank epitomized a business model in the banking industry, conceived to maximize rates of return on equity through aggressive asset growth and minimization of capital and funding risk. 34 In essence, this increased short-term gains for shareholders, while the business risk was externalized onto other stakeholders and society.
Notwithstanding the lessons from recent and past crises, corporate law has remained anchored to a legal form that is very close to that of its initial modern codifications.
35 Despite reviews and law reforms, it has been observed that the current form of company law increasingly shows its inefficiency to face the ever-changing challenges that are posed by new corporate structures and by the ubiquitous influence of capital markets on corporate strategies.
36 This is the case especially in the context of leveraged financial institutions where the risk-bearers are not only the shareholders, but a broader range of stakeholders. 37 However, while large public corporations play a prominent role in society, their actions vis-à-vis societal stakeholders remain unregulated or neglected by company law. This is largely due to the narrow framework that is widely accepted as being the mandate of company law, focusing chiefly on the relationship between shareholders and directors (i.e., the agency problem), and giving way to the shareholder primacy assumption. 38 Under this view, the regulation of other relationships, namely those affecting social stakeholders or the environment, should be left to contractual negotiations or to specific regulation external to company law. 39 The GFC, and the cases highlighted earlier, represent an ideal case study to support the contentions made in this Article. Firstly, that the process of corporate decision-making has been flawed and it has failed to correctly appreciate issues of risk-taking. 40 Traditionally, the central concern within UK and U.S. corporate law has been related to the regulation of the agency problem. 42 This flows directly from the delegation of managerial powers to the board and the resulting separation of ownership and control. 43 The divorce of the two main components of corporations (equity ownership and the relating management) triggered the necessity to find a model of corporate governance that provided legitimization to the decision-making process within large public corporations. The resulting problem of managerial hegemony was initially identified by Berle, who recognized that the modern corporate form epitomized by dispersed ownership gave rise to a control void. 44 While this was considered an intrinsic feature of the modern corporation, it posed questions of accountability and legitimacy. 45 the pioneering work conducted by Berle approached the problem that is today persisting in contemporary corporate governance. Interestingly, despite acknowledging the development of capital markets as a means of capital allocation, Berle remained dismissive of the powers of the market as a discipline mechanism over managerial behavior. This stemmed from Berle's doubts on the informational efficiency of capital markets, which he argued were reflected in the irrationality of investors' decision-making and in their incentives to choose strategies often not aligned with the long-term interest of the firm. 46 As Berle was also cognizant of the increasingly externalized (and arguably residual) role of shareholders in the governance of corporations, 47 the main source of direction over corporate decision-making rested on professional managers who were tied to the company through trust and property law mechanisms. 48 While this did not solve the accountability deficit and, if anything, further exacerbated it, Berle also developed a theory of "public consensus" based on the existence of a set of values endorsed by the community, and often by the corporation too. In Berle's rather optimistic view, the company's decision-makers would not disregard the interest of the community due to citizens' increasing influence on corporate affairs. 49 Moreover, under this design the public consensus would be enforced on managers because of a "corporate conscience," represented by managers' perception of the public consensus.
50 This is close to what is recognized today as a firm's reputation, described as "loss of prestige, public standing and popular esteem," which would undermine the public trust toward the corporation. 51 This represented a first level of informal constraint over corporate decision-making according to Berle, and it would be supplemented by more forcible measures in the shape of regulation, reflecting the democratic force of the state reacting to a violation of the public consensus.
52
The idea that management would not act in a way that is contrary to what is perceived as "public good" represented probably an overvaluation of the democratic mechanisms available to the general public. Enforcing the lack of consensus against corporate power (the board) was and remains today a prerogative of shareholders, both in the United Kingdom and in the United 
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States. 53 In this sense then, the control void identified by Berle remained legally unresolved, especially given his lack of faith in shareholders to be able to bring about accountability in a wider context. This legal problem persists today given that shareholders are unable to assess the extent to which strategies endorsed by the board are socially acceptable or aligned to wider interests.
54
This argument is even stronger today, because institutional shareholders (representing a large slice of the shareholder population in the United Kingdom and the United States) are increasingly identified with hedge funds and similar investment vehicles. 55 These entities hold stock for short periods of time, averaging eight months, and therefore tend to have little interest in the company's long-term success, with their main concern being represented by quarterly gains. 56 Ultimately, the solution to the accountability problem envisaged by Berle seemed to be a "least bad" scenario, with corporate power held by professional managers only theoretically accountable to a community consensus.
57
It is realistic today to say that accountability hinges on a private-type legal relation between those who hold decision-making powers (the board) and those who are seen as beneficiaries of those managerial power (shareholders). 58 These private arrangements are, in most cases, inadequate for two main reasons. Firstly, because from a legal perspective, as highlighted earlier in this Article, this leaves the board unaccountable to a number of constituencies (all but the shareholders in fact). Secondly, the multidimensional nature of large public firms, with different layers of management and a multitude of interested stakeholders, sits very oddly with a mono-dimensional accountability framework that essentially relies on the wisdom of one constituency in the company. This leaves an open question, not only in terms of accountability, but more importantly of legitimacy. As already stated, finding new forms of legitimacy to the decision-making process of large public corporations remains an open task in corporate law scholarship.
The question has been reprised by John Parkinson, who in more recent times stressed the importance to find a public interest justification of corporate power. 59 The recognition of public corporations as a force capable of shaping society. As such, the public outcome of private (internal) decision-making needed to be legitimized so that modern corporations could provide some form of public or social purpose to the wealth they created. In essence, he viewed large public firms as forms of social enterprises. 60 This line of thought has been supported by both legal and political theory. In particular, it has been maintained that the possession by private companies of decision-making power which has a social dimension is legitimate only if decisions are taken in the public interest. 61 It follows that society is entitled to ensure that corporate power is exercised in a way that is consistent with the public interest. 62 Ultimately, Parkinson's argument was not aligned with the conventional wisdom prevailing over the last three decades-that pursuing shareholder value would bring about benefits for all other stakeholders and more generally that profit maximization was conducive to public interest goals.
63
The agenda espoused by Parkinson reflected to some extent the work of Eric Orts, who, again in sharp contrast with the direction of mainstream corporate scholarship, contended that corporate law should provide a framework for legal and political legitimacy of decision-making. 64 This should take account of the technical and normative complexity of the underlying process and therefore should result in more detailed standards of behavior. While Orts accepted that the advocated legal and technical process would increase complexity, he argued that this would be offset by the social benefits deriving from the resulting standards. 65 At this stage of the discussion it needs to be specified that the problems so far debated are originally related to the Anglo-American corporate ownership structure and its model of corporate governance. However, it has been argued by Professor Mitchell that this model has been exported globally, 66 together with the process of "financialization" of corporate governance, which inevitably attenuated the difference between shareholder 60. Id 
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The Corporate Law Dilemma 253 and stakeholder orientations. 67 The global integration of financial markets that occurred from the 1990s was mainly prompted by ideological developments from the United Kingdom and the United States. These were grounded on the undisputed reliance on market discipline and shareholder value, and similarly, global financial institutions promoted the application of the shareholder-oriented model across many different jurisdictions. 68 However, as discussed earlier, there has been no end of history in corporate law. Scandinavian countries, as well as Germany or France, have maintained a more balanced approach to corporate governance and financial development by prioritizing issues of social stability and welfare. 69 This argument is important for the present discussion because it shows that a different model to control and direct corporate decision-making is possible and it is eventually rooted in different ways to regulate corporate relationships. 70 This fundamental differentiation originates from a different idea of corporation that emerged in Germany and other northern European countries, and is still reflected today in a process of decision-making that allows greater centrality to employees' interests. 71 Early German companies were already concerned with general welfare interests and were geared toward social goals rather than simply the pursuit of profits for shareholders, which characterized their UK counterparts. 72 German companies were the product of a different regulatory framework which reflected a type of capitalism centered on cooperation and pluralism, where the state retained a central, and at times intrusive, role in steering market players' behavior toward these goals. 73 Similarly, German financial markets were traditionally characterized by the overwhelming role of large banks vis-à-vis securities markets, which entailed a more limited access for corporations to disintermediated sources of finance and less interdependence with market logics. The challenges of directing decision-making processes in a more inclusive way seems thus to be traditionally related to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance, based on large public companies with dispersed shareholding, driven by the pursuit of profits for shareholders. 75 The following section will clarify this contention by illustrating the shortcomings of the two main models of corporate governance: shareholder value and stakeholder theory.
B. A CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Since the 1930s, corporate law scholars have strived to address the fundamental question of the corporate objective and clarify what constituency should be identified as main beneficiary of corporate decisionmaking. This debate originated at Harvard, around the contrasting views of professors Berle and Dodd. 76 The crux of the dispute was reflected in the dichotomy between a minimalist and a maximalist stance on corporate governance.
Professor Berle's approach was grounded on the configuration of managerial powers as powers held in trust, whereby the beneficiaries of that trust should have been the shareholders as owners of the firm. This minimalist position was grounded in Berle's view of property law mechanisms as tools to protect shareholders by creating legal safeguards against management's deviation from the ultimate profit goal. 77 Professor Dodd, on the other hand, advocated what was defined as a maximalist vision of corporate governance, whereby the powers held by management were not to be conceived only for the pursuit of shareholders' wealth, but for the benefit of other social groups too. 78 The seeds of this quest have flown in more recent times into what has substantiated the corporate objective dilemma. As already announced, this is reflected in two models of corporate management that provide diverging approaches to the problem of controlling and directing decision-making: shareholder value and stakeholder theory. As will be explained in the following sections, these two paradigms originated from very diverging politico-economic assumptions developed in the 1970s and it is fair to say that the recent GFC has contributed to reassess their appropriateness. A critique of both models will be useful to better understand the difficulty to channel corporate activities and provide sound mechanisms of 75. Johnston, supra note 21, at 65 (observing that smaller companies tend to be subject to greater social control and are naturally constrained by social norms with respect to the effects that their decision-making creates). 
76.
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The Corporate Law Dilemma 255 accountability. This critique will also pave the way for the proposal of a new paradigm, the ESC, as an alternative model of corporate decision-making. The foundation of shareholder value lies in the emergence of financialeconomic theories in the early 1980s, which in turn stemmed from the strong neoliberal consensus that occurred in the same period, chiefly in the United Kingdom and the United States. 79 In the context of corporate governance, this translated into the development of "contractarian" theories of the firm by law and economics scholars, who identified the company as a nexus of contracts among different constituencies, with shareholders recognized as owners and residual claimants. 80 This economics-centric approach advanced the concept of economic efficiency which in turn justified the corporate goal of maximizing returns for shareholders as the best possible allocation of resources.
81
It is worth repeating that the prioritization of shareholders ahead of other stakeholders became more critical in the last twenty years due to the increasing influence of capital markets on corporate strategies. 82 Deep and liquid stock markets were relied upon as sources of information in regard to the value of stock 83 and as monitoring mechanisms. 84 This was exemplified more typically by the employment of stock options and other forms of market-based compensations which were envisaged as an ideal tool to align the interest of management and shareholders. 85 The assumptions that justified the application of shareholder value have however, become unpopular in recent years. The corporate scandals that occurred during the last decade and the GFC contributed greater strength to the critics of shareholder value. 86 This section lays out some of the arguments brought against the shareholder value paradigm.
The first strong argument made by legal scholars is that the economic conception of shareholders' ownership is misguided. It overlooks the fact that by law, shareholders are merely owners of the shares they hold and not of the 87 This entails that rights and expectations are limited by law to what flows from their shares (typically a right to vote, and receive dividends) and this automatically defies the rhetoric of ownership that has essentially redefined the property rights of one constituency in the corporation. 88 Similarly, the identification of shareholders as residual claimants has been strongly refuted. The rationale for the assumption was that unlike other constituencies who have a right to a fixed claim (such as employees, managers, creditors) shareholders rely on whatever remains after the company has paid its fixed claims. 89 Law and economics scholarship argued that shareholders, as ultimate risk-bearers, have the greatest stake in the company and should benefit from it being run for the purpose of maximizing the value of stock. 90 This construction however, is based on an incorrect proposition because, as pointed out by Lynn Stout, shareholders are treated by corporate law as residual claimants only when the company is insolvent.
91
Outside insolvency, shareholders are entitled by corporate law mechanisms to receive payments only if the company has retained sufficient profits, and if the board declares dividends to be paid.
92
Together with the above two points, shareholder value rests on another assumption that derives from the economic-rather than legalconfiguration of the company, namely the principal-agent model. This is closely linked to the contractarian view of the company advocated by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in the late 1970s and then consolidated in more recent scholarship. 93 The principal-agent model has, 
90.
Id. at 37. The assertion by Easterbrook and Fischel here is grounded in the belief that investment by shareholders is based on a promise to maximize the value of stock. If that promise is not maintained, it will be difficult to raise new money, because prospective investors would not trust the promise to maximize shareholder value. This, in turn, would lead to undesirable consequences in the economy because the general level of investments would collapse.
91. STOUT, supra note 14, at 40 (observing that outside bankruptcy, it is wrong to suggest that shareholders are entitled to whatever is left once the company's obligations are paid).
92.
Id. This leads to concluding that shareholders are just one of several groups that can be described as residual claimants, in the sense that they can enjoy benefits beyond those provided in their explicit contracts. 
See
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The Corporate Law Dilemma 257 however, been strongly criticized for failing to capture the essence of large public firms. The structure of these entities is based on many fractional shareholders and different organizational layers of management, which go clearly beyond the simplification proposed by the principal-agent model.
94
One of the presumed advantages associated with the shareholder model is the direct accountability that it creates, because shareholders would be motivated to monitor the board. This assertion has become contentious for two reasons. Firstly, because the degree of accountability is not evident in large public corporations, where the effective powers of shareholders to control the board and shape its decision-making is not substantial enough. 95 Secondly, it is observed that shareholders are not a monolithic category, as they encompass different categories and types of investors. Beyond having different preferences and interests in the company, their involvement in the company's affairs will also vary.
96
Much of the criticism against shareholder value in the last ten years has revolved around the increased interplay of corporations with financial markets. In particular, the belief that share prices are a reliable measure of the value of the company has been contradicted. While deep and liquid stock markets do respond quickly to new information, it has become evident that share prices deviate substantially from their value through periods of boom and bust. 97 This has a number of explanations, primarily identified with the complexity of financial information that is transmitted to the market and the difficulty to process it correctly. 98 Behavioral explanations are also put forward because markets tend to overreact, leading to investors' herding behavior and other socio-pathological phenomena. This translates into stock prices going out of line, moving upward or downward, regardless of the fundamentals. 99 More generally, share price can be misrepresented by market or industry fluctuations which do not necessarily reflect the real value of the company. 100 94. STOUT In essence, share price has been tainted as an unreliable index of corporate success. This became evident after Enron, which showed how manipulated and misleading information could be released into the market. The pressure to maximize shareholders' wealth led executives to pursue short-term strategies finalized at inflating the company's share value, mainly through accounting manipulations or complex off-balance sheet transactions. 101 In other words, pursuing the quarterly growth of share price became the main goal of management, regardless of the company's fundamentals.
This problem was accentuated by the application of stock options, employed as corollaries of shareholder value to guarantee a strong link between firm's performance and managers' remuneration, whose interests would remain aligned with shareholders. 102 The main problem of stock options is the incentive they create to pursue risky strategies. This is due to the intrinsic moral hazard they involve, because option-holders win big if the option goes up but are not penalized if the stock price plunges.
103
Shareholders' limited liability allows benefiting from high risks and high levels of leverage because they can reap the gains of the investment, while the underlying risks are borne by other stakeholders. 104 In highly-leveraged financial institutions in particular, the opportunity for rapid expansion of financial assets and short-term returns on equity has led to excessive risktaking. 105 Stock options have exacerbated executives' incentives to speculate through risky transactions because the more valuable the options, the more risky the underlying investment.
106
The criticism toward executives' pay is often associated with more general concerns over the suitability of market mechanisms to control managerial behavior and direct decision-making toward the long-term interest of the company. Much scholarship has been dedicated to clarifying whether the market for corporate control (in the shape of hostile takeovers) could represent a valid corporate governance tool. While no conclusive 
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The Corporate Law Dilemma 259 evidence has been produced in this sense, 107 shareholder value proponents supported the assumption that the threat of takeovers would constitute a sufficient discipline mechanism on the board and that liability rules and statutory mechanisms would be superfluous. 108 Against this proposition, it has been argued that hostile takeovers often have detrimental effects on employees and other stakeholders, 109 and they exacerbate short-termism when executives engage in "empire-building" strategies, 110 something that was feared in the context of the recent AstraZeneca's attempted takeover. Despite providing an allocative function of corporate resources, hostile takeovers' role as a corporate governance mechanism has been largely redefined as a residual one, whereas other internal tools should provide the necessary control of managerial decision-making.
111
C. A CRITIQUE OF STAKEHOLDER THEORY
The stakeholder theory originated from social-democratic ethos that were developed in the post-war years and were later channeled into a communitarian philosophy. This envisaged a more inclusive and multidimensional approach to corporate law. 112 The ideology was more clearly defined in the 1980s when the concept of stakeholder was integrated within organizational behavior studies. 113 It posited that beyond shareholders, other constituencies contribute to the corporation and their interests too deserve consideration, particularly because they are often not covered by contractual provisions. 114 Traditionally, German corporate law epitomizes a typical stakeholder approach with its codetermination system. This grants employees certain powers in the management of the company by allowing employees' representatives to sit on the supervisory board. 115 In essence, the fundamental feature of stakeholder theory consists of having boards that undertake the function of balancing the interests of different constituencies. The pluralistic foundation of stakeholder theory has been often pointed at as its main problem. This line of criticism became recurrent in the 1990s in connection with the stagnation of social-democratic economies in continental Europe. 116 It was then suggested that the theory could lead to inefficiency because it did not provide guidelines as to how the board should balance different (possibly conflicting) interests and it did not even define the concept of stakeholder, therefore leaving a problem of subjectivity in the identification of these interests. 117 The enforceability of stakeholders' rights was also seen as a problem because courts would find it problematic to interfere with subjective boards' policies, trying to impose objective standards. 118 The enforceability of stakeholders' rights is further hindered by the procedural barriers that in most legal systems do not permit all stakeholders to initiate derivative actions.
119
Another problem associated with the stakeholder theory is the lack of standards to evaluate corporate performances. Departing in fact from shareholder value entails that share price is not relied on as the main metric of corporate success. The absence of equivalent stakeholder standards upon which the management can be evaluated leaves an accountability gap, because under the theory there is no specific constituency that can hold the board accountable. From a different perspective, it would be unlikely that any group will perform an efficient monitoring function on the board for fear of other groups' free-riding.
120
The above arguments have led to strong criticism on the competitiveness of corporations organized under the stakeholder model. The underlying objection is that departing from shareholder primacy would affect firms' ability to maximize their value because of the impossibility to balance conflicting claims and operate beyond a mono-dimensional (shareholder) goal.
121 Shareholder value proponents argued that this dilemma would be most clearly reflected in the context of takeover bids where the interest of 119. Keay, Ascertaining the Corporate Objective, supra note 3, at 676. In the United Kingdom, for instance, only shareholders on behalf of the company are allowed to bring a derivative claim. Keay observes that unless they are also members of other stake-holding groups, they will be reluctant to bring an action that will entail costs. Id. 121. Jensen, supra note 15, at 300.
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122
This last critique carries also a normative dimension. Stakeholder theory would inevitably broaden the narrow framework that has so far characterized the mainstream Anglo-American approach to corporate law, because it would encompass and directly regulate the social costs created by the company (currently dealt with by external regulation or market mechanisms). 123 Moreover, this approach would be less competitive according to shareholder value proponents because of its less facilitative normative framework.
D. WHY A NEW MODEL?
Much of the critique laid out in the previous sections is supported by corporate scandals that occurred throughout the last fifteen years. In particular, corporate and financial failures have coincided with the breakdown of shareholder value mechanisms: this was true for the Enrontype scandals, for the failures of financial institutions in the United Kingdom and in the United States during the GFC, and for the environmental disasters epitomized by the BP oil spill. 124 The corporate governance dimension of these failures can be identified, inter alia, with flawed systems of decisionmaking. In particular, risk-management and control functions were not adequately conducted by boards whose priorities remained geared toward the increase of share value 125 to the detriment of long-term objectives. 126 This approach to corporate management resulted in the failure to take account of different societal interests that were heavily affected by corporate behaviors.
A more specific manifestation of this unfair societal arrangement is provided by recent events in the financial and environmental industries, which have been illustrated earlier in this Article with the cases of BP and RBS. Admittedly, the failure of shareholder value to provide a valid model of corporate management became evident in the early 2000s with the wave of "accounting frauds" epitomized by Enron. In the context of financial institutions, the centrality of shareholder value has become even more [Vol. 12 contested. 127 This was recently confirmed by an EU Green Paper that acknowledged a number of problems in the governance of financial institutions. 128 It noted that a presumption of effective shareholder control in financial institutions is misguided because shareholders will be concerned with short-term financial goals instead of the entity's long-term viability. 129 However, this view has not translated in substantial reforms or shifts in policy directions. On the contrary, despite much criticism (particularly within academic circles 130 ) shareholder value has remained the widely accepted criterion of corporate decision-making 131 and policy responses to the GFC have not departed from a shareholder-centric agenda. 132 This tendency shows that, notwithstanding the lessons drawn from recent events, the neoclassical theories advancing shareholder supremacy are still very central to policymaking and law reforms in the area of corporate law. 133 In the United Kingdom, both the Stewardship Code of 2012 and the Corporate Governance Code of 2016 promoted wider shareholder participation in corporate governance. The former followed the recommendation of the Walker Review 134 and set out monitoring responsibilities on shareholders, and recommendations for institutional investors to act collectively to that end and on voting policies. 135 The Corporate Governance Code also promoted enhanced shareholder power specifically with regard to pay-setting procedures. 
See generally Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions
and Remuneration Policies COM (2010) 284 final (June 2, 2010).
129.
Id. at 8 (The report specified that this attitude reflected shareholders' excessive risk-taking which is in turn encouraged by performance-related incentives for managers.). 
This emerges from a number of initiatives, which includes the
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As noted earlier, this approach is misguided in the context of large public corporations. It has been observed that fragmented ownership and foreign investments are not conducive to shareholders' enhanced participation 137 because the interest of this type of shareholder is largely geared to short-term quarterly gains, 138 and active engagement in corporate governance represents costs that would reap economic benefits only in the longer term. This assertion is confirmed by shareholders' votes in 300 annual general meetings in 2012 where, on average, votes against remuneration reports reached only 7.64%.
139
One of the reasons for the resilience of shareholder value over the last fifteen years is the absence of an alternative model, given the mistrust in the United States and the United Kingdom, for stakeholder-based theories which are regarded as fundamentally impractical. 140 The flaws associated with shareholder-based decision-making processes, however, can no longer be neglected. Placing one constituency at the center of very complex and multidimensional organizations has proven unjustified 141 and socially destabilizing. The corporate governance failures, of which mention has been made, have created externalities on a number of constituencies whose interests were not adequately considered by BoDs, notably: employees, taxpayers, consumers, local communities, and the environment. Notwithstanding the potential harm to large sections of society, complex risks (such as environmental or financial) in large public firms were consistently understated by executives who were kept myopically focused, due to perverse market incentives, on the pursuit of short-term goals.
The question as to why risks were not properly gauged is a complex one. Assessing and managing risks is among the most critical aspects of the decision-making process of large public firms. While this delicate process has resulted in unsatisfactory outcomes, it needs to be explained that in many circumstances, warning signs were raised by risk-managers within firms. Richard Posner has argued that BoDs driven by shareholder value goals are more likely to ignore red flags, chiefly because the function of risk-managers is not aligned with the overarching profit-making objective. 142 On the other hand, boards tend to rationally follow traders who pursue short-term profits driven by market-based incentives. 143 The way in which risks have been underestimated in large public firms can also be explained through the mechanics of risk perception in boards. Behavioral studies have examined how psychological and cultural forces alter risk perception in large firms and thus affect decision-making. Donald Langevoort has observed that overconfidence in periods of boom leads to persistence, effort, and enhanced risk-taking, which will outperform more realistic and cautious strategies. 144 Overconfidence, especially in times of boom, becomes embedded in the corporate culture and will result in common bias in the organization, which also risks affecting the perception of those who conduct external assessments. 145 It is correct to say that the way risk is perceived within an organization becomes institutionalized because of psychological and cultural forces that will make individuals believe that there is no risk big enough to worry about. 146 In the context of decision-making processes, overconfidence toward risk can become a self-fulfilling prophecy in times of good fortune. It is also true that overconfidence before the crisis was fueled by the availability of risk modeling and risk mitigation techniques that further affected individuals' cognitive bias and led to institutional underestimation of risk.
147
Boards' decision-making was also driven by investors' expectations. Keeping the stock price inflated required firms to keep "dancing,"
148 because this form of behavior was deemed functional to maintain a competitive edge over other firms (especially in the financial sector) and satisfy investors' demands for quarterly gains. 149 This suggests that beyond the behavioral explanation of investors' irrational exuberance, stock prices were fundamentally mispriced because firms failed to disclose information to allow the accurate assessment of risk. 150 In other words, if share price remains the metric for corporate management, the distorted reactions of the stock market will likely produce biased behavior among investors and affect decision-making at board level. 145. Langevoort, supra note 144, at 1220-23 (The inside bias will influence non-executive directors and also gatekeepers because they will tend to believe in the inaccurate disclosure produced by those who have inside knowledge. 
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The brief behavioral explanations of corporate decision-making show that risk-management functions have been hindered by cultural and organizational factors. This means that the cognitive dimension of this fundamental function has been dominated by profitability instead of an objective assessment of risks.
A final note needs to stress that the Anglo-American shareholder-centric model of corporate governance has relied since the 1980s on non-executive directors (NED) to bring an independent outside perspective to the company's decision-making. The collapse of financial institutions during the GFC unveiled, however, a systematic failure of banks' financial strategies. This included general breakdowns in the duties of executives but more importantly in the risk-management function performed by NEDs who were not able to scrutinize the transactions entered into by banks and their increasing level of leverage.
152
One problem associated with NEDs is that they tend to lack industry or firm-specific expertise because of the "outside" position they have in the company. It has also been observed that their primary function in public corporation is to manage the stock price and its maximization in the short term, which effectively makes them guardian of shareholders' interests. 153 It may be further noted in this sense that NEDs' independence is particularly valued for their ability to relate to inputs by securities analysts and institutional investors in regard to the optimal firm's capital allocation. NEDs' full inception in the United States in the 1980s corroborates the above explanation, given that the 1980s were characterized by the increase in debt finance and leveraged buyouts and the employment of off-balance sheet financing.
154
The dilemma related to NEDs' independence is that while their objective and detached perspective is necessary to balance CEO's and executives' bias, this function equally depends on a certain degree of knowledge of the company's strategies and culture, which, however, risks defying NEDs' independence. 155 As noted by Marc Moore, this tension between independence and expertise has clearly shifted over the last ten years, with the former prevailing in the 2000s and the latter in the post GFC period.
156
As these requirements can hardly coexist in NEDs, this may result in more specialized boards in industries that involve complex products and/or an element of public concern (such as financial services or utilities), while [Vol. 12 independence may prevail in contexts where the main corporate governance concern remains the conflicts of interests at the board level.
More general criticism has pointed to the lack of incentives for NEDs to provide objective assessments. This has a twofold explanation. Firstly, the same behavioral explanations apply to NEDs who are acquiescent to market conditions in times of boom. 158 Secondly, agency problems extend to independent directors too, and this translates in dangers of "groupthink" between executives and independent directors with the same industry background. 159 In essence, the natural solution to this problem would be to bring ex ante an expert outside perspective to work inside the firm. The next section will illustrate how this could be realized.
III. THE ENLIGHTENED SOVEREIGN CONTROL PARADIGM AS A NEW MODEL OF CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING
A. THE CONCEPT OF ESC
The arguments laid out in the previous section expose the urgency to find a new model to govern decision-making processes in large public firms and provide legal certainty to the question of the corporate objective. To address this problem, this Article puts forward the ESC paradigm as an alternative to shareholder value and stakeholder theory.
The concept of ESC is derived from a number of theories that need to be briefly highlighted in this section. The work conducted by Mitchell emphasized the nature of corporations as "externalising machines." 160 He observed that while at the individual level, decisions have an impact on the decision-maker who will often directly feel the effect of its consequences and hence will have moral constraints, the result of the same process within a corporation is depersonalized because of limited liability and the interposition of the corporate vehicle between decision-makers and those affected by the decision. 161 The corporate structure also allows externalizing costs related to corporate profit-making activities onto other groups who are affected by the corporation but have no powers to shape its behavior. Mitchell argues that as artificial legal entities, corporations lack the framework that allows a moral perspective of the choice, and thus they are naturally led 157. Id This line of critique leads to questioning limited liability and its conceptual foundations. In particular, this has involved the reprisal of the old concession company law theory, first developed in the Victorian Age. The theory viewed limited liability as a concession concurred by the state, flowing into the right of incorporation. 163 While under this construction the company was seen as a right granted by the state and thus derived from its power, contemporary scholarship has revisited the theory in a more socialized form. Professor Dine has argued that modern corporations are actually derived from society because they benefit from the cooperation and interplay of several social groups. 164 This implies a bottom-up concession theory whereby society represents the foundation of corporations, and communities would have the power to influence corporate decision-making. 165 This line of thinking entails that companies would not only be derived from society, but they would be responsible to a democratically represented community. 166 In this sense, a strong pluralist approach has been developed by Gunther Teubner who expanded the gist of the traditional stakeholder concept. He regarded corporations as entities that should advance the privileges of both internal (shareholders or employees) and external groups (such as communities and the environment). The board would therefore be called to embrace a more holistic approach to management. 167 Teubner's proposition rests on the hypothesis that a corporation does not only exist as a self-serving and self-realizing entity, but it has to fulfill a broader social role. In order to achieve this, the organizational structure of the corporation and the way it is managed should be shaped to reflect the interest of society. 168 This entails a different determination of the corporate objective because different social groups would become relevant insofar as they represent social interests and are in a position to control fiduciary duties. 169 An ensuing and more complex 162. Id. at 43-44 (observing that this is so because decision-makers in the company take the shape of the company and are absorbed by the corporate culture).
163. configuration of corporate relationships would address problems of accountability, explored earlier in this Article, because all those who have interests in the company would be represented in the decision-making process. According to Eric Orts, corporate law theory should depart from the simplifications dictated by economic policy, and the resulting legal framework should take account of the technical and normative complexities that underpin the varieties of corporate relationships. Orts argues that more detailed rules on corporate behavior can provide social benefit notwithstanding the increase in legal complexity, because they would create the right balance between positive freedoms and negative constraints that would adequately structure corporate power. 170 Ultimately, corporate law should provide legal and political legitimacy in the context of board decisionmaking, but this has been difficult to achieve. As observed by Orts in 1993, policy-making in the sphere of corporate law is anchored to economic efficiency discourse, which in turns dominates discussions about legitimacy.
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The ESC is proposed as an alternative model of corporate management and embraces the motives of the above theories to the extent that they offer greater recognition of social priorities vis-à-vis economic ones. It generates from the overarching belief that social and welfare interests should be embedded among the goals of those corporations whose activities impact a wide range of constituencies. However, the ESC recognizes the importance of public firms for the creation of social wealth, and therefore looks at measures that would not curtail entrepreneurship. The ultimate need to combine economic interests and social concerns pushes toward a balanced (indeed enlightened) intervention of the state (hence the use of the word sovereign) as guardian of social interests (which implies control).
The characteristic feature of the ESC is represented by the involvement of the state in balancing the different interests at stake in large public corporations and therefore in shaping their corporate objective. Unlike other stakeholder-oriented propositions that advocated a similar redirection of corporate actions toward more inclusive goals, the ESC is unique in the way it seeks to rebalance this fundamental function. This procedural mechanism will be explained in the next section, but it is worth clarifying at this stage that decision-making processes in large public corporations would be shaped by the different composition of their BoDs, which would be complemented by the direct inclusion of state professionals.
performance and function, taking into account at the same time the interest of the non-economic environment.
170. Orts, supra note 64, at 1597. 171. Id. at 1595. Orts argues that while economic efficiency has driven all legitimacy arguments, a normative justification that would be reflected in legal rules and processes is also needed. These would provide legitimacy to corporate power. Id.
